Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction

Who adopted this document and its mandates?

A Resolution of the General Assembly, under agenda item 99m Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, published in 2025.

What other versions does this mandate have?

28 versions · 1999–2025

Year	Symbol	Title	Word length	Text similarity
2025	A/RES/80/34	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	3,633	65%Compare
2024	A/RES/79/56	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	3,506	88%Compare
2023	A/RES/78/29	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	3,130	87%Compare
2022	A/RES/77/73	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	2,795	93%Compare
2021	A/RES/76/29	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	2,681	95%Compare

What subjects does this mandate have?

5 subjects

Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons Use Disarmament Agreements Treaty Compliance Weapons Destruction

What’s in this document?

50 operative paragraphs

Reaffirms its condemnation in the strongest possible terms of the use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances, emphasizing that any use of chemical weapons anywhere, at any time, by anyone, under any circumstances is unacceptable and is and would be a violation of international law and expressing its strong conviction that those individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons must and should be held accountable;

Recalls that article I, paragraph 5, of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction provides that each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare, and in this context expresses grave concern about allegations of their use by the Russian Federation in its war of aggression against Ukraine and urges the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to continue to closely monitor the situation and be ready to investigate the matter as appropriate, notes the requests for clarification on this issue submitted under article IX of the Convention and subsequent discussions in the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and recalls the technical assistance provided to Ukraine by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation;

Notes with grave concern the reports of the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 18 November 2024,³ 14 February 2025⁴ and 20 June 2025⁵ following technical assistance visits requested by Ukraine, which confirmed the presence of the riot control agent 2‑chlorobenzalmalononitrile (known as CS) in samples collected from locations along the confrontation lines in the Dnipropetrovsk region;

³S/2338/2024.

⁴S/2370/2025.

⁵S/2415/2025.

Condemns in the strongest possible terms the use of a toxic chemical as a weapon against Alexei Navalny in the Russian Federation, notes with grave concern the note by the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 6 October 2020 on the summary of the report on activities carried out in support of a request for technical assistance by Germany,⁶ and underlines the need for a full and transparent investigation and that those responsible for the use of chemical weapons against Alexei Navalny must be held accountable;

⁶S/1906/2020.

Also condemns in the strongest possible terms that chemical weapons have since 2012 been used in Iraq, Malaysia, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, including as reported by the Joint Investigative Mechanism of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations and by the Investigation and Identification Team of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in the following reports issued during the Assad rule of the Syrian Arab Republic:

The reports of the Joint Investigative Mechanism of 24 August 2016⁷ and 21 October 2016,⁸ which concluded that there was sufficient information to determine that the Syrian Arab Armed Forces were responsible for the attacks which released toxic substances in Talmenes, Syrian Arab Republic, on 21 April 2014, in Sarmin, Syrian Arab Republic, on 16 March 2015, and in Qmenas, Syrian Arab Republic, also on 16 March 2015, and that the so-called “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant” used sulfur mustard in Marea, Syrian Arab Republic, on 21 August 2015;

⁷See S/2016/738/Rev.1.

⁸See S/2016/888.

The report of the Joint Investigative Mechanism of 26 October 2017,⁹ which concluded that there was sufficient information to be confident that Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was responsible for the use of sulfur mustard at Umm Hawsh on 15 and 16 September 2016 and that the Syrian Arab Republic was responsible for the release of sarin at Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017;

⁹See S/2017/904, annex.

The first report of the Investigation and Identification Team, of 8 April 2020,¹⁰ which concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force used chemical weapons in Ltamenah on 24, 25 and 30 March 2017;

¹⁰See S/2020/310, annex.

The second report of the Investigation and Identification Team, of 12 April 2021,¹¹ which concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that a military helicopter of the Syrian Arab Air Force carried out a chemical weapons attack on Saraqib on 4 February 2018;

¹¹See S/2021/371, annex.

The third report of the Investigation and Identification Team, of 27 January 2023,¹² which concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the Syrian Arab Air Force carried out a chemical weapons attack on 7 April 2018 in Duma, Syrian Arab Republic;

¹²See S/2023/81, annex.

The fourth report of the Investigation and Identification Team, of 22 February 2024,¹³ which concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe that units of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant used chemical weapons during attacks on 1 September 2015 in Marea, Syrian Arab Republic;

¹³See S/2024/200, annex.

and demands that the perpetrators be held accountable, noting in this regard that the Syrian Arab Republic has a vested interest in investigating and holding to account perpetrators of any use of chemical weapons on its territory;

Recognizes that the secretive nature of the former regime’s chemical weapons programme continues to pose significant challenges to the Syrian Arab Republic in identifying and eliminating any remaining chemical weapons, production facilities and related materials and equipment, and also recognizes that these challenges are compounded by gaps in documentation, limited institutional memory and technical expertise, economic constraints, insufficient equipment and security threats;

Welcomes the recent positive cooperation by the new Government of the Syrian Arab Republic with the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the designation of a national team to facilitate implementation of the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under the Convention;

Reiterates the importance of clarifying all outstanding issues related to the initial declaration by the Syrian Arab Republic, obtaining clarifications on the full extent and scope of the Assad-era Syrian chemical weapons programme as well as verifying and destroying its possible remnants, and ensuring long-term compliance by the Syrian Arab Republic with the Convention;

Calls upon States Parties in a position to do so to provide, upon request, appropriate technical assistance and equipment, training, funding and capacity-building support to the Syrian Arab Republic, in order to help address its technical and institutional challenges to identify and safely destroy any remaining elements of the former regime’s chemical weapons programme, in accordance with the objectives of the Convention;

Welcomes decision EC-110/DEC.1 of the Executive Council, entitled “Expedited on-site Destruction of any remnants of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic”, of 8 October 2025;

Recalls:

The reports of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons regarding alleged incidents in Ltamenah,¹⁴ Saraqib¹⁵ and Duma,¹⁶ Syrian Arab Republic, as well as reports regarding the alleged incidents in Marea¹⁷ and Kafr Zayta,¹⁸ Syrian Arab Republic, which concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe that a toxic chemical or a vesicant chemical substance from 1.A.04 scheduled chemicals under the Convention had been used as a weapon;

¹⁴See S/2017/931, annex, and S/2018/620, annex.

¹⁵See S/2018/478, annex.

¹⁶See S/2019/208, annex.

¹⁷See S/2022/85, annex.

¹⁸See S/2022/116, annex.

The report of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 28 June 2023,¹⁹ which concluded that information obtained and analysed by the fact-finding mission did not provide reasonable grounds to determine that chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents that occurred in Kharbit Massasneh, Syrian Arab Republic, on 7 July and 4 August 2017;

¹⁹See S/2023/508, annex.

The report of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 22 February 2024,²⁰ which concluded that information obtained and analysed by the fact-finding mission did not provide reasonable grounds to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incident that occurred in Al-Yarmouk, Syrian Arab Republic, on 22 October 2017;

²⁰See S/2024/214, annex.

The report of the fact-finding mission of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 11 June 2024,²¹ which concluded that information obtained and analysed by the fact-finding mission did not provide reasonable grounds to determine that toxic chemicals were used as a weapon in the reported incidents that occurred on 9 August 2017 in Qalib al-Thawr and on 8 November 2017 in al-Balil, Syrian Arab Republic;

²¹See S/2024/486, annex.

Also recalls the adoption of:

Decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties, entitled “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use”, of 27 June 2018;

Decision EC-94/DEC.2 of the Executive Council, entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, of 9 July 2020;

Decision C-25/DEC.9 of the Conference of the States Parties, entitled “Addressing the possession and use of chemical weapons by the Syrian Arab Republic”, of 21 April 2021;

Decision C-28/DEC.12 of the Conference of the States Parties, entitled “Addressing the threat from chemical weapons use and the threat of future use”, of 30 November 2023;

and stresses the importance of their implementation, in accordance with the Convention, and, accordingly, expresses concern with the conclusions contained in the report of the Director General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of 14 October 2020 on the implementation of decision EC-94/DEC.2;²²

²²EC-96/DG.1.

Reiterates its grave concern that, despite the verified destruction of all 27 chemical weapons production facilities declared by the Syrian Arab Republic during the Assad era, the Technical Secretariat, as reported by the Director General in his report of 24 September 2025,²³ assessed that the Syrian Arab Republic had submitted a declaration that still could not be considered accurate and complete in accordance with the Convention, Executive Council decisions EC-M-33/DEC.1 and EC‑94/DEC.2 and Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) of 27 September 2013, as well as with the conclusion of decision C-SS-4/DEC.3 of the Fourth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties that the Syrian Arab Republic had failed to declare and destroy all of its chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities, and underscores the importance of such full verification;

²³EC-110/DG.15.

Recognizes the distinct historical and institutional context in which the chemical weapons programme was developed and operated under the former Syrian regime and the ongoing efforts of the new Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and to fulfil the country’s obligations under the Convention;

Recalls decision C-26/DEC.10 of the Conference of the States Parties, entitled “Understanding regarding the aerosolised use of central nervous system-acting chemicals for law enforcement purposes”, of 1 December 2021;

Emphasizes that the universality of the Convention is essential to achieving its object and purpose and to enhancing the security of States Parties, as well as to international peace and security, underlines the fact that the objectives of the Convention will not be fully realized as long as there remains even a single State not party to the Convention that could possess or acquire such weapons, calls upon all States that have not yet done so to become Parties to the Convention without delay, and in this regard recalls the outcome of the Third Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (the Third Review Conference);

Welcomes the confirmation by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons of the full destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles, and notes that the last chemical weapon from a declared stockpile was verified as destroyed in July 2023;

Underlines that the end of destruction of all declared chemical weapons stockpiles is an important milestone for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and a critical step towards achieving its mission to permanently eliminate all chemical weapons;

Also underlines the fact that the full, effective and non‑discriminatory implementation of all articles of the Convention makes a major contribution to international peace and security through the elimination of declared stockpiles of chemical weapons and the prohibition of their acquisition and use, and provides for assistance and protection in the event of use or threat of use of chemical weapons and for international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities;

Notes the impact of scientific and technological progress, including challenges and opportunities arising from the rapid development of artificial intelligence, on the effective implementation of the Convention and the importance for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its policymaking organs of taking due account of such developments;

Reaffirms that the obligation of the States Parties to complete the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and the destruction or conversion of chemical weapons production facilities in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and the Annex on Implementation and Verification (Verification Annex) and under the verification of the Technical Secretariat of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is essential for the realization of the object and purpose of the Convention;

Stresses the importance to the Convention that all possessors of chemical weapons, chemical weapons production facilities or chemical weapons development facilities, including previously declared possessor States, should be among the States Parties to the Convention, and welcomes progress to that end;

Notes with concern that, along with the threat of the possible production, acquisition and use of chemical weapons by States, the international community also faces the danger of the production, acquisition and use of chemical weapons by non‑State actors, including terrorists, concerns which have highlighted the necessity of achieving universal adherence to the Convention, as well as the high level of readiness of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and stresses that the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention, including those on national implementation (article VII) and assistance and protection (article X), constitutes an important contribution to the efforts of the United Nations in the global fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations;

Notes that the effective application of the verification system builds confidence in compliance with the Convention by States Parties;

Stresses the importance of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Convention as well as in promoting the timely and efficient accomplishment of all its objectives;

Urges all States Parties to the Convention to meet in full and on time their obligations under the Convention and to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in its implementation activities;

Welcomes the progress made in the national implementation of article VII obligations, commends the States Parties and the Technical Secretariat for assisting other States Parties, on request, with the implementation of the follow-up to the plan of action regarding article VII obligations, urges States Parties that have not fulfilled their obligations under article VII to do so without further delay, in accordance with their constitutional processes, and in this context reaffirms that full, effective and non‑discriminatory implementation of article VII is essential for the realization of the object and purpose of the Convention;

Emphasizes the continuing relevance and importance of the provisions of article X of the Convention, welcomes the activities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in relation to assistance and protection against chemical weapons, supports further efforts by both States Parties and the Technical Secretariat to promote a high level of readiness to respond to chemical weapons threats as articulated in article X, and welcomes the effectiveness and efficiency of the increased focus on making full use of regional and subregional capacities and expertise, including taking advantage of established training centres;

Reaffirms that the provisions of the Convention shall be implemented in a manner that avoids hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties and international cooperation in the field of chemical activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, including the international exchange of scientific and technical information, and chemicals and equipment for the production, processing or use of chemicals for purposes not prohibited under the Convention;

Emphasizes the importance of the provisions of article XI of the Convention relating to the economic and technological development of States Parties, recalls that the full, effective and non‑discriminatory implementation of those provisions contributes to universality, and reaffirms the undertaking of the States Parties to foster international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the field of chemical activities of the States Parties and the importance of that cooperation and its contribution to the promotion of the Convention as a whole;

Notes with appreciation the ongoing work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to achieve the object and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the full implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties;

Regrets that, despite the constructive engagement of most of the States Parties in the preparatory process leading to the Fifth Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, it was not possible to adopt a final document, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of subjects covered at the Fifth Review Conference received very broad support and that a wide range of delegations undertook efforts towards a consensual outcome;

Welcomes the opening of the Centre for Chemistry and Technology, which strengthens the capabilities of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and its member States to implement the Convention, uphold the global norm against chemical weapons, address threats and opportunities arising from rapid progress in science and technology in the evolving global security landscape and support international cooperation;

Takes note of decision EC-102/DEC.6 of the Executive Council, entitled “Allowing the convening of Executive Council meetings or sessions in extraordinary circumstances”, of 16 March 2023;

Welcomes the cooperation between the United Nations and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons within the framework of the relationship agreement between the United Nations and the Organisation,²⁴ in accordance with the provisions of the Convention;

²⁴United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2160, No. 1240.

Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its eighty-first session, under the item entitled “General and complete disarmament”, the sub-item entitled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction”.

Who adopted this document and its mandates?

What other versions does this mandate have?

What subjects does this mandate have?

What’s in this document?

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