Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World : A New Agenda

Who adopted this document and its mandates?

A Resolution of the General Assembly, under agenda item 73d Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world : the need for a new agenda, published in 2003.

What’s in this document?

39 operative paragraphs

Reaffirms that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity;

Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear-arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Calls upon all States to fulfil all their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

Calls upon all States parties to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁸ the outcome of which provides the requisite plan to achieve nuclear disarmament;

⁸See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, vol. I (NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), part I.

Agrees on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;4

Calls for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;

Underlines the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in the context of the progress achieved in implementing the international monitoring system;

Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,2 as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and to apply the principle of irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment;

Acknowledges that the reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (“the Moscow Treaty”)⁹ represent a positive first step, and calls on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty verifiable, irreversible and transparent and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure;

⁹See CD/1674.

Agrees that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and be carried out in a comprehensive manner, including:

Further reductions in and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;

The implementation of reductions in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;

The preservation, reaffirmation and implementation of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;

The formalization by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and the initiation of negotiations on further reductions of such weapons;

The enhancement of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of such weapons in physically secure central storage sites with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process to which they are committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the necessary steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons in this regard;

The achievement of further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

The achievement of concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

The undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these weapons not to increase the number or types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or rationalizations for their use;

The prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons;

Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to increase their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures;

Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should establish, without delay, an appropriate ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament;

Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives;

Agrees that the Conference on Disarmament should complete the examination and updating of the mandate on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, as contained in its decision of 13 February 1992,¹⁰ and re-establish an ad hoc committee as early as possible;

¹⁰CD/1125.

Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of all five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

Notes that the third and, as appropriate, fourth meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, taking into account the deliberations and results of the previous sessions, should make every effort to produce a report containing recommendations to the Review Conference;

Stresses the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;

Calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States parties;

Notes the proposals on security assurances that have been submitted to the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and calls upon the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference to allow time to thoroughly consider the matter of security assurances at its third meeting so as to make recommendations to the Review Conference on how to take the matter forward;

Calls upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without condition, to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 15 May 1997,¹¹ for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment and refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation;

¹¹International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

Reaffirms the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the regions concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objective of nuclear disarmament;

Expresses concern at tensions in the Middle East and South Asia, and renews support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia;

Calls upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude full-scope safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency and to conclude additional protocols to their safeguards agreements on the basis of the Model Protocol;

Calls upon the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to reconsider its recent announcements, with a view to being in full compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and in this connection supports all diplomatic efforts for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation and for the establishment of an area free of nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula;

Stresses that the International Atomic Energy Agency must be able to verify and ensure that nuclear facilities of the States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are being used for peaceful purposes only, and calls on States to cooperate fully and immediately with the Agency in resolving issues arising from the implementation of their respective obligations towards it;

Calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the International Atomic Energy Agency to carry out the verification requirements set forth in the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement signed by the two States on the basis of the model legal framework that has been agreed on and that is now available to be used in new verification agreements between the Agency and each of the two States;

Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing, as soon as practicable, of their fissile material no longer required for military purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes;

Affirms that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments;

Acknowledges the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 57/59,¹² and requests him to prepare a report, within existing resources, on the implementation of the present resolution;

¹²A/58/162 and Add.1.

Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-ninth session an item entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: a new agenda”, and to review the implementation of the present resolution at that session.

Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World : A New Agenda

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